What are the philosophical approaches to ethics

REPORT

from: Issue 1/2019, pp. 22-34


Where can you still do something with Aristotle today?

Again and again we experience renaissance in philosophy. If existing discourses threaten to run dry, theoretical explanatory figures no longer seem viable enough, or if the desire slowly spreads among philosophers to look for concepts that have more or less proven themselves in the course of the history of philosophy, then it is not far off to take a look into the past and dig there for old treasures of knowledge, because - as the saying goes - those who have been told dead live longer.

A philosopher who has been declared dead again and again, but whose treasure trove of knowledge has always been raised anew, is Aristotle, of whom such a modern and versatile thinker and reader as Ludwig Wittgenstein once said that he was the only philosopher of whom he didn't read a single word (26, 496). Whether this statement by Wittgenstein is to be understood ironically, or rather tries to make plausible that hasty recourse to philosophical classics affects the authenticity of our contemporary questioning and problematization, shall not be discussed at this point. However, it cannot be denied that Aristotle is again playing an important role in the current philosophical discourse, if he was ever absent from this academic conversation (1).

But what could be the obstacles that prevent you from revisiting Aristotle in the most unbiased way possible? (2):

First of all, here is the natural worldview of the Stagirite and, in connection with it, his ontological realism to call. Aristotle always wants "to the things themselves" or dwells on them by distinguishing non-living from living objects, examining beings first of all for their specific causes and considering everything naturally occurring as a scientific object of knowledge. In this context his idea of ​​appears a teleological constitution of the world or of the living things in it, sometimes naive, although his categorical descriptions of living beings or the way they exist are still very clear and have astonishing explanatory power.

For Aristotle, however, a certain understanding of practice is associated with this natural view of things, which is decisive ethical naturalism influenced: Thus, according to Aristotle, man finds everything he needs to be happy in "his" own nature (and not beyond this; if he sees himself as a purely autonomous rational subject), which suits him and his actions Frame gives. 'By nature' (phýsei) is the human being, who as a living being endowed with understanding and language (zōon logon echon) used to understand one's practical reason, geared towards moral action and a virtuous life. The Aristotelian conception differs from this ethical practice Art as a productive doingthat serves to imitate the natural world and its experience and can thus be distinguished from genuinely modern aesthetic principles (such as those developed by painting or theater in the early 20th century), according to which the classic mimesis postulate must be questioned and deconstructed .

Although Aristotle is still extremely prominently represented in the contexts and discourses just mentioned, today we find what is probably the broadest and most elaborate discussion of his thoughts in philosophy, namely in the disciplines of metaphysics (3), philosophy of science (4), political philosophy ( e.g. 30) and ethics (5). These approaches, which explicitly refer to Aristotle as the source of ideas and one of the philosophical sub-areas mentioned here, confidently operate under the label 'neo-Aristotelian' or 'neo-Aristotelianism'. So-called 'Neo-Aristotelians' - especially in the Anglo-American discussion - represent a relatively independent type of philosophical explanation and justification, which cannot be reduced to the function of a pure revival of a philosophical position from the past.

In the German-speaking philosophical discussion, the situation is different. In this country, 'Neo-Aristotelianism' was and is mostly spoken of in the area of ​​tension of political philosophy, where authors such as Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Schnädelbach (6) have introduced the term to describe a bourgeois philosophy, which is primarily supported by a neo-conservative ideological-political sentiment . Above all, names are brought into play here that are associated with the so-called "Knight School": Hermann Lübbe, Manfred Riedel, Robert Spaemann, Ernst-Wilhelm Böckenförde or Odo Marquard. Among these philosophers, the recently deceased Robert Spaemann deserves special mention who has received and adapted the current neo-Aristotelian ethical model in some respects (29) in order to make it fruitful for a specific theory of the person (20).

Current Neo-Aristotelianism in Ethics

A new start in ethics or "old wine in new bottles"?

Despite the various modes of reception in contemporary philosophy, Aristotle and his rediscovery play a major role, especially in contemporary ethics. The ethical neo-Aristotelianism has undoubtedly had a strong influence on the moral-philosophical discussion in recent decades, in that it was able to both set critical impulses and to initiate innovative proposals for a new conception of the idea of ​​the ethical. Their representatives have tried to rekindle the fire that is in Aristotle's thoughts on ethics and to pass it on using modern linguistic means and methods of argumentation. For this reason, Neo-Aristotelianism in ethics is also to be understood as a genuinely modern project.

The British moral philosopher and Wittgenstein student Elisabeth Anscombe gave the decisive boost to a re-engagement with the Aristotelian ethics. In her epoch-making essay Modern moral philosophy from 1958 she turns against utilitarian and Kantian forms of justification of normative ethics, with the aim of opening the field for the development of theories of the good based on virtue ethics (7). In view of her demand for a 'philosophy of psychology' and the targeted criticism of the moral use of language in the formation of ethical theories, Anscombe comes to the conclusion that terms such as 'duty' or 'self-legislation' are remnants of no longer existing, religiously founded ethical concepts and are in favor of one Contemporary practical justification of normativity proved unsuitable:

“We should throw the concepts of duty and obligation - in the sense of moral duty and moral obligation - overboard [...], if this is psychologically possible, as well as our concepts of the morally right and wrong and the moral sense of ,should'; for they are all holdovers or derivatives of holdovers from an earlier conception of ethics that no longer generally exists today, and they are only disadvantageous outside of this conception. "(7, 217)

However, Anscombe does not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater with this criticism. Rather, their critical statements aim to reveal two decisive inadequacies of modern moral philosophy: On the one hand, Anscombe, with a view to Immanuel Kant, considers the idea of ​​an autonomous will that gives itself the moral law to be not intelligible or psychologically untenable; on the other hand, it rejects the attempt, so formative for modern ethics, to formulate moral judgments without recourse to statements of being. This so-called should-be-fallacy, also called Hume's law, makes the assumption of a subjective feeling or a personal attitude (approval or disapproval) necessary for the normative justification and justification of moral action and thus forms the basis for modern subjectivist approaches to noncognitivism. In this essay, as in other writings, Anscombe opposes this type of moral justification and the theory that emerges from it, according to which the moral value of an action depends solely on the consequences. It also gives this specific moral theory a name: "consequentialism".

Elisabeth Anscombe points in Modern moral philosophy in particular also to the fact that Aristotle with his ethical conception had already succeeded in combining moral action with a certain form of normativity, which is based on different premises than the Humean and Kantian models of ethical justification. The philosopher steers modern moral philosophy in a certain direction. Your proposal, cited below, to redefine what standards are or could be, will later become so-called in the context of their introduction and specification Aristotelian necessities picked up:

“Just as humans have one or so many teeth, which is certainly not the average number of teeth of all humans, but the number of teeth characteristic of the human species, so perhaps humans as a species 'have' these and the virtues, if one does not consider it purely biologically, but from the side of the activities of thinking and choosing in the context of the various areas of life. And this 'man' with the full set of virtues is the 'norm', just as the man with the complete set of teeth is the norm. But in this sense 'norm' has ceased to be roughly synonymous with 'law'. "(7, 235)

In the course of this observation, however, Anscombe admits that “philosophically there is still a considerable gap [...] which can be closed by an understanding of the essence of man, of human action, of the property type of virtues and, above all, of human 'prosperity' must "(7, 241). Nonetheless, it provides the decisive intellectual impetus for a number of subsequent approaches based on virtue ethics, which make similar diagnoses and pursue comparable goals, the most important of which are to be emphasized:

● The modern moral philosophy must be put on new feet. In doing so, virtue ethics should at most be established as an independent paradigm of justification for normative ethics or at least act as an authority to supplement or criticize deontological and consequentialist justification approaches.

● Actions are no longer the focus of the ethical evaluation, but rather concrete people as their bearers and enforcement subjects. According to this, justice is not just the result of a successful balancing of procedural ethical mechanisms (such as in Rawls and Habermas), but consists in the ethical action of people who are or want to be just themselves. The virtuous actor thus appears as an independent normative authority, which means that moral models can be upgraded compared to abstract moral principles.

● Linguistic-philosophical analyzes and meta-ethical approaches should increasingly focus on concepts of virtue before they, e.g. B. the deontic logic, examine ought sentences for their inner consistency. This goes hand in hand with the demand of some representatives of virtue ethics to take greater account of "thick" (i.e. phenomenologically-descriptive) instead of "thin" (i.e. analytically-evaluating) concepts when investigating the sources of normativity.

● In view of the numerous moral dilemmas in applied ethics, virtues and their determination serve to better identify the problem or risk situation at hand, as well as the more precise description of correct and incorrect attitudes towards this or that dilemma situation. Virtues thus find their way into our concrete ethical practice as explanatory and decision-making aids.

● Modern virtue ethics makes implicit and explicit substantive assumptions about the specific ethical shape and design of human life. It not only gives an answer to the question: 'What should I do?', But also to the question "How should and can I live (well)?"

From the classical doctrine of virtue to modern virtue ethics

As we have already seen, a modern ethic inspired by Aristotelian insights offers a good opportunity, with the help of the category of virtue, to give an up-to-date answer to well-known, but at times somewhat morally underdeveloped questions. So if we ask, from a genuinely modern point of view, why we actually still need virtue ethics at the present time and, if we are inclined to answer this question with yes, then we then ask what we can still understand by virtue today, the answer is that both in historical as well as more categorical To make important differentiations: For example, Stephen Gardiner goes with a conceptual historical intention, i. H. With a view to a necessary distinction between classical and modern virtue ethics, we assume that from today's perspective we are forced to adopt a paradoxical attitude towards ancient and medieval virtue ethics, and cites two reasons in particular:

a) It is undisputed that the world views of the representatives of classical positions of virtue ethics differ fundamentally from the world views of modern representatives of virtue ethics.

b) Likewise, it cannot be denied that there was an unfortunate historical and institutional split within the "movement" of virtue ethics. (21) However, these reservations cannot change the fact that there are still good reasons for a moral-philosophical one Recourse to the virtues that we encounter again and again in practical life and that we nowadays cum grano salis can also be described as 'skills' or 'competencies'.

From a systematic point of view, however, the following should be observed: When we speak of 'the' virtues in the plural, we are primarily referring to a specific one Phenomenology of Moralityaccording to which we can observe without judgment that virtues (and vices) are irreducible parts of the practical life of individuals and communities. If, on the other hand, we speak of 'the' virtue in the singular, then we are making direct reference to a specific one Category of moralitythat immediately competes with other terms of the same kind (e.g. duty, benefit, etc.). In the following, however, it will be shown that the two approaches to the term cannot be clearly separated from one another, even if virtues as manifestations of ethical practice are more likely to be located in the area of ​​application orientation.

This inevitably results in a further need for differentiation: The summary and description of virtues usually takes place within the framework of a virtueteach instead, which sets up catalogs of character excellence that can be expanded at will (e.g. 28), while a virtueethics automatically enters into competition with deontological and consequentialistic drafts in order to turn to specific normative questions beyond the description. Christoph Halbig specifies this distinction as follows: “The doctrine of virtue tries to understand what virtues are: their ontology, epistemology and their theoretical meaning. The ethics of virtue, on the other hand, asks about the role of virtues in ethics. The determination of this role will vary depending on which model a normative ethics is based on. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, forms such a model alongside others, which is characterized by the fact that it considers Aretan categories (i.e. those that relate to virtues and vices, such as 'cowardly' and 'generous') to be fundamental and demotic (such as 'Right' or 'forbidden') or in extreme cases even evaluation (such as 'good' or 'bad' trying to reduce categories to them. "(22, 11)

How can the current Neo-Aristotelianism be classified in this scheme? First of all, it should be noted that the current Neo-Aristotelian ethics is a transformed Version of the classical Aristotelian ethics represents or includes. In doing so, it appears almost exclusively as a virtue-ethical model and thus automatically competes with the established and already mentioned paradigms of ethical justification theories of deontology and consequentialism.

As one self-employed The normative alternative to deontology and consequentialism, especially the philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse, understood her virtuous ethical version of neo-Aristotelianism and developed it concisely (12).She begins with the observation that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics only insufficiently provide reasons for correct action. While consequentialists have to state what the best consequences are and deontologists have to give information about the way in which universalized norms can be applied to concrete action situations, it is the task of virtue ethics to show how a virtuous actor should be and act . For this purpose, Hursthouse develops specific precepts ("v-rules"), e.g. "Don't break any promises!"; "Don't lie!", Which express like moral actors characteristically should act. With this regular definition of the virtues which are practiced by practical reason (phronésis) gives a special rank in the treatment of the other virtues, Hursthouse believes he has developed an ethical approach that is normative on the same level as deontological and consequentialist theories. With this intention, Hursthouse is not alone in the concert of the current Neo-Aristotelians, but most sympathizers of a modern virtue ethic see themselves as representatives of one mixed or dependent theory, d. H. a theory that can only make virtue ethical insights plausible with the help of consequentialist or deontological elements.

Non-Aristotelian, Aristotelian-nonnaturalistic, Aristotelian-naturalistic models of justification for virtue ethics

It is now anything but easy to understand to what extent models of justification based on virtue ethics can actually be considered 'Aristotelian' or 'neo-Aristotelian', since these approaches are anything but homogeneous. For this reason, only a certain part sees itself as 'Aristotelian', whereby today's neo-Aristotelians can be further distinguished into ethical non-naturalists and ethical naturalists. To the models, the virtues on genuine non-Aristotelian Wanting to justify the basis include above all empirical and non-empirical approaches of moral psychology and a large part of the Kantian, consequentialist and neostoicist approaches. While in the context of moral-psychological approaches virtues are understood and analyzed as situation-related states and not as robust character traits overarching these ephemeral states, the latter-mentioned moral-philosophical theories mostly only use virtues to enrich their own empirically unsaturated approach with material and motivational points of view.

To aristotelian, non-naturalistic Models of the justification of virtue ethics include exemplary approaches (33) and works that emphasize the paramount importance of practical reason. Daniel Russell, for example, developed a concept that is supposed to represent a "hard virtue ethic" (16). The highest Aristotelian virtue of practical reason or practical intelligence is not only a necessary but a sufficient condition in order to act correctly. An evaluative one Relation to a concept of human nature would put this claim and the action-guiding authority of the practical intelligence into perspective, because - according to critics - this would have to resort to resources outside the theory, the normative influence of which would call the autonomy of ethics into question.

The majority of the representatives of an Aristotelian justification of virtue ethics, however, see themselves as ethical naturalists, although the understandings of nature put forward for their own theory differ greatly in terms of content (also from the Stagirite's concept of nature himself). 'Naturalistic' here has the general meaning that a life led for the sake of virtues is a life that is naturally good or is in harmony with the good of man or his nature. From such an Aristotelian naturalism (short: AN) in the narrow sense one can speak especially at Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and Rosalind Hursthouse; from an AN in a broad senseAlasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, on the other hand, do not want to be limited to a 'naturalistic' understanding of human nature.

Clear references in terms of content to Aristotle and his ethical naturalism are decisive for all the authors named here, but by no means self-evident, because here and there it should be shown whether the AN's own version is called 'Aristotelian' or 'naturalistic' at all and, if it withstands this test, how 'Aristotelian' or 'naturalistic' it ultimately is (5, Section B). In addition, it should be clearly stated how a genuinely neo-Aristotelian model of ethics or ethical naturalism relates to other existing ethical models and conceptions of naturalism and to what extent neo-Aristotelian ethics recourse to metaphysical insights, e.g. taken from Aristotelian biology and ontology can be justified at all with regard to answering current questions of morality. That the latter is or should be possible is shown by the approaches of those Neo-Aristotelians who insist that a teleology of man must take into account biological functions of reproduction and self-preservation, but should also go beyond these purposes in order to become an ethical one To be able to flow into practice that is fundamentally guided by reason.

As a first important representative of an AN in a broad sense Alasdair MacIntyre emphasizes that most contemporary approaches to virtue ethics, especially the metaphysical implications of Aristotelian biology, are no longer willing to share (13, 200). In addition, today there are hardly any representatives of a virtue ethic who hold on to the ancient thesis of the unity of virtues (13, 240). For these and other reasons, MacIntyre endeavors to re-establish virtue ethics on a genuinely communitarian basis, relying above all on Aristotle to focus on the social nature of man. Central to MacIntyre is the concept of practice, which can only be meaningfully justified and applied within law firms.

Martha Nussbaum chooses a completely different way of translating classic considerations about virtue into modernity. First of all, virtues for them are those qualifications which can be derived from basic human experiences and therefore can be regarded as universal. Aristotle is read by Nussbaum as follows: “This is how the Aristotelian approach works: It is committed to a general (and open) picture of human life, its needs and possibilities, but is involved in the concrete historical and cultural conditions in every phase. [...] Finally we should point out that the Aristotelian virtues and the considerations on which they are based, in contrast to some moral systems, always remain open to change and thus take new circumstances and facts into account. "(15, 144)

With the help of classical virtue ethics, according to Nussbaum, it can succeed in combining universalistic claims with particular habits and in this way reconciling the two spheres. This makes virtue ethics interesting for the justification and justification of certain economic approaches and global theories of justice.

As probably the most outstanding representative of an AN in the narrow sensePhilippa Foot, who does not derive the good (of man) from a platonic idea (of the good) or from divine instructions, but from the generalizable assessment of the natural goodness of plants and animals, should be named Philippa Foot. In her last epoch-making work Natural goodness (German The nature of good) She has made the sometimes provocative proposal to subject ethics to a fundamental new beginning: “One may like to hear it - or how it will happen to many - less like to hear: In this book I have the declared aim of presenting a conception of moral judgment that differs considerably from the view of most moral philosophers who write today. "(8, 19) This new beginning no longer puts the anti-naturalistic interpretation and normative mediation of subjective preferences and attitudes at the center of the analysis, but what we - in general spoken - to call 'life'. This does not mean any absolute metaphor or ontologically fundamental category, but rather 'the fact that a human action or disposition is good' if it is' a certain characteristic of a certain type of living being concerns. "(Ibid.)

One of the central concerns of Philippa Foot's long-time friend Elisabeth Anscombe was also to work out the different dimensions of the adjective "good" and to look for a common evaluation structure that enables normative judgments to be justified and justified. Foot tries to follow this lead to show as a good Wittgensteinian that a substantial theory of the good is based on a special grammar that encompasses several meaning dimensions of the adjective "good" ("good from", "good for", "good as", "the good / the goods / good things ") and is able to make it clear that there is a common evaluation structure that can be obtained from the reference to species-typical properties of human and non-human forms of life.

Foot's moral-philosophical approach consists primarily of two parts: On the one hand, the idea, following Peter Geach's considerations, to attribute "good" to an attribute (10), ie to understand it as a property that is functionally dependent on the noun that is to be qualified ("The / the / the good X"); and once from the attempt to gain and secure the objectivity of morality through the teleological-normative reference to non-human forms of life. Even in her early work, Foot dealt extensively with a specific grammar of the good and demonstrated that the use of "good" can be defended against relativistic and non-cognitivistic narrowing of terms (e.g. 9). After a humean interim phase in which Foot Wanted to identify hypothetical imperatives as a source of reference for moral reasons for action, she found her way back to a non-subjectivist justification of morality by relying on the idea discovered by Anscombe and further developed by Michael Thompson Aristotelian necessities fall back on:

“These 'Aristotelian necessities' are based on the needs of the respective plant or animal species to act on their natural living conditions and possibilities, which are defined in their behavioral repertoire. It all defines how the representatives of a certain species should be and what they should do. "

Some time before, Peter Geach had - in a less elaborate form - brought the same idea to the following formula:

“People need virtues like bees need their sting. [...] A single bee can perish through the use of its sting, but bees need stings; a single person can die by being brave or righteous, nevertheless people need courage and righteousness "(11, 16)

As categorical expressions describe the Aristotelian necessities in generalized form that 'on which the good depends'. To illustrate this shape, Anscombe chose to include the example of the human with 32 teeth already given Aristotelian necessities all characteristics which, for a certain thing, insofar as it belongs to a kind, indicate what is necessary to be a good specimen of just that kind. These features thus prefigure certain categorical statements that are constitutive for the formation of so-called life form judgments of the kind 'It is part of a mother lion to teach her young to hunt'. Aristotelian necessities or their logical representations, the so-called Aristotelian categoricals, have the general form 'S is (owns or does) F' and can even be extended to include a teleological component to judgments of the form 'S is, owns or does F in order to [...]' (17). In contrast to other representatives of a contractor in a broad sense Foot ties norms back to a non-statistical understanding of human nature, but not with the aim of restituting classical theonomic ethics such as natural law, but rather to give a natural place to the binding nature of good action.

In the previous section we spoke in particular of the neo-Aristotelian form of ethical naturalism. But what functions do virtues assume in an Aristotelian ethical model with a naturalistic character? According to Philippa Foot, virtues are precisely those character excellence that describe an action that follows reasons and is thus linked to a certain form of practical rationality. Basically, virtues function as corrective insofar as they counteract harmful temptations (e.g. persistence against excessive alcohol consumption) or unwanted accidents (e.g. preventive protection against bicycle accidents by taking the precautionary measure of wearing a helmet). At the same time, however, virtues are also used to compensate for deficits in motivation (e.g. someone keeps a promise although it speaks against his current and future self-interest), or are used for compensation purposes if someone ignores or naturally the claims of third parties made on himself fades out (here, for example, one might think of the social virtue of justice).

It is particularly noticeable that all representatives of the AN take metaethical developments in the 20th century (especially GE Moore's idea that "good" is a simple, non-natural and non-definable property) very seriously German tradition of moral philosophy, especially influenced by Kant, was always reluctant to take up these thoughts productively - probably also because it was not used to distinguishing between moral content and moral statements or between ethical motives and practical reasons (a difference which first formulated the project of an analytical [meta] ethics and then knew how to use it for itself). Kant's formalistic ethics remains largely unaffected by the consequences and implications of the naturalistic fallacy, although Moore did not want to spare it in this regard. since they make moral judgments based solely on an autonomous reason, the judgments subject to a test for consistency. However, the postulated autonomy of ethics ultimately falls victim to its lack of material basis, since it is not clear what content the moral judgments presented by autonomous reason have and how these judgments relate to judgments that result from the respective (non-human or human) species or life form. (cf. the comparison of the Kantian and Aristotelian normativity concepts in 27)

The AN, especially the AN in a narrow sense, however, tries precisely to go the last-mentioned path and to justify and justify the objectivity of moral judgments by referring to natural norms that he gains from the evaluation of these very forms of life. The contractor is basically also characterized by aspects that are only to be mentioned here (based on 23), but are discussed in much more detail in the documents mentioned in the bibliography:

● The contractor qualifies 'good' as an attributive adjective.

● The contractor gains practical relevance through the explicit reference to the virtues.

● The AN emphasizes the transformative power of rationality.

● The contractor assumes a relationship between natural teleology and normative validity.

● Due to the dependence of moral judgments on species assessments, the contractor questions the autonomy of ethics.

outlook

What is the future of neo-Aristotelianism in ethics? This will show, among other things, whether virtue ethics of Aristotelian provenance can withstand the situationist challenge, which denies the existence of virtues as robust, cross-situation characteristics, and whether - with regard to the AN - a normative reference to human nature is differentiated in itself The model of "first nature" (18) must be exhausted or expanded to a "second nature" (14) in order to be able to escape a scientifically and empirically narrowed understanding of what we are and do as human beings.

However, here and there it is important to remember that we are dealing with an amalgam of different influences and interpretations in the case of neo-Aristotelian approaches to ethics. This also means that it is still difficult to precisely trace back individual considerations to specific historical sources and contexts. However, what should be illustrated with great clarity in this report is the fact that we are dealing here with approaches that take human life, in all its facets and ethical implications, seriously. Neo-Aristotelianism in ethics is certainly not a homogeneous model with which we can foresee, evaluate and solve ethical problems; rather, it is itself the source from which our theoretical and practical knowledge of what we are and what we should do is nourished. In this regard, it also offers the opportunity to approach questions that have mainly been discussed in the continental tradition of philosophy. Important points of contact can be found not only in German Idealism (25), but also in the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein (31), Friedrich Nietzsche (24) and Thomas von Aquin (19; 31).

By the way, at the end of her academic career it was very important to Philippa Foot to get back into a serious intellectual exchange with the continental philosophical tradition of philosophy, especially the German one, which did not involve "polite tourism" (8, 11) This polite tourism has now turned into a lively and, above all, promising discourse.

OUR AUTHOR:

Martin Hähnel is a PhD philosopher and currently a research assistant at the professorship for bioethics at the KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. From him on the topic have already appeared: (as author) Theories of good. For the introduction (with Maria Schwartz), Junius: Hamburg 2018; (as editor) Aristotelian naturalism, Metzler: Stuttgart 2017; Normativity of Life - Normativity of Reason?, De Gruyter: Berlin 2015.

Literature on the subject:

Edited volumes, reviews and reference essays on Neo-Aristotelianism:

generally:
[1] Rapp, C. / Corcilius, K. (ed.), 2011, Aristotle Handbook: Life-Work-Effect, Stuttgart: Metzler.

[2] Buchheim, T. et al. (Ed.), 2003, Can you still do something with Aristotle today ?, Hamburg: Meiner.

Metaphysics:
[3] Novotny, D. / Novak, L. (eds.), 2014, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics. New York: Routledge.

Philosophy of Science:
[4] Simpson, W. / Koons, R. / The, N. (eds.), 2017, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. New York: Routledge.

Ethics:
[5] Hähnel, M. (ed.), 2017, Aristotelian Naturalism, Metzler: Stuttgart (English translation 2019 by Springer Dordrecht).

Political Philosophy:

[6] Schnädelbach, H., 1986, "What is Neo-Aristotelianism?" In: W. Kuhlmann (Ed.): Morality and Morality. The Problem of Hegel and the Discourse Ethics, Frankfurt a. M .: Suhrkamp, ​​38-63.

Important works of ethical Neo-Aristotelianism:
[7] Anscombe, E., 1958 (1974), "Modern Moral Philosophy", In: Philosophy 33/124, 1-19. (German translation: Grewendorf, G. / Meggle, G. (ed.), Language and ethics, Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, ​​217-243)

[8] Foot, P., 2004, The Nature of Goodness. Frankfurt a.M .: Suhrkamp.

[9] Foot, P., 2009, "Moral Arguments", In: Dies., Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Clarendon, 96-109.

[10] Geach, P., 1956, "Good and Evil", In: Analysis 17, 35-42.

[11] Geach, P., 1977, The Virtues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[12] Hursthouse, R., 1999, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[13] MacIntyre, A., 1987, The Loss of Virtue. On the moral crisis of the present, Frankfurt a.M .: Campus.

[14] McDowell, J., 1998, "Two Sorts of Naturalism", In: Ders., Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 167-197.

[15] Nussbaum, M., 1998, "Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian approach", In: Rippe, H.P. / Schaber, P. (ed.), Tugendethik, Reclam: Stuttgart, 114-165.

[16] Russell, D., 2012, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[17] Thompson, M., 2010, Life and Action, Cambridge / Mass .: Harvard University Press.

[18] Thompson, M., 2013, "Forms of nature", In: Hindrichs, G. / Axel, H. (eds.), Freiheit, Frankfurt a. M .: Klostermann, 701-735.

Further secondary literature on the topic:
[19] Borchers, D., 2010, “'You can learn a lot from him' - Thomas Aquinas and the virtuous revival in analytical ethics". In: M. Kühnlein (ed.), Kommunitarismus und Religion, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 201-228.

[20] Buchheim, T./Noller, J., 2016, “Are real and, if so, why are all people persons? On Robert Spaemann's philosophical definition of the person "In: Kreiml, J. / Stickelbroeck, M. (ed.), The person - their self-being and acting, Regensburg: Pustet, 145-179.

[21] Gardiner, S. M., 2005, "Virtue Ethics Here and Now", In: Ders., Virtue Ethics Old and New, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1-8.

[22] Halbig, C., 2013, The concept of virtue and the limits of virtue ethics, Frankfurt a.M .: Suhrkamp.

[23] Halbig, C., 2015, “A new start in ethics? On the Critique of Aristotelian Naturalism ". In: Markus Rothhaar / Martin Hähnel (eds.), Normativity of Life - Normativity of Reason? Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 175-197.

[24] Harcourt, E., 2007, "Nietzsche and Eudaemonism", In: Gudrun von Tenevar (ed.), Nietzsche and Ethics, Bern: Peter Lang, 89-118.

[25] Kern, A. / Kietzmann, C. (Ed.), 2017, Self-confident life. Texts on a transformative theory of human subjectivity. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

[26] Monk, R., 1991, The Duty of a Genius, London: Vintage.

[27] Rothhaar, M. / Hähnel, M. (Ed.), 2015, Normativity of Life - Normativity of Reason? Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter.

[28] Seel, M., 2011, 111 virtues, 111 vices: A philosophical review, Fischer: Frankfurt a. M.

[29] Spaemann, R., 2004. "When a bad coincidence in life robs us of happiness". In: FAZ of November 26, 2004.

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