What is a progressive mind in reality

1. Hegel's annihilation of what is sensibly given and its inversion in Feuerbach

The deepest secrets lie in the simplest natural things which the fantastical speculator, languishing beyond, tramples. The return to nature is the only source of salvation.

(Feuerbach, On the criticism of the Hegelian philosophy.)

The sensuality is that Ultima ratio, the All in all, the doctrine of the senses, the doctrine of the ultimate things, where all mysteries are revealed.

(Feuerbach, Against the dualism of body and soul, flesh and spirit.)

As soon as [...] the human being [...] discovers the semblance of the senses, with this semblance he also discards the true essence of the senses [...] and replaces the sensual realities with beings that he has thought himself.

(Feuerbach, Critical remarks on the principles of philosophy.)

1Hegel's thinking is shaped by an aversion to the given. Empiricism, which regards the sensual as something given, is to him “a doctrine of bondage”, since freedom consists in “that I have no absolutely other against me, but depend on a content that I myself am” (E. , § 38 Z). The sensual is not “the truly substantial basis”, but “just the empirical first” or the “beginning basis” (E, § 442 A), actually “nothing” (HW V, 44), since “nothing is real as the idea ”(HW VII, 25) or“ the spiritual ”(HW III, 28). Hegel's idealism consists precisely in the view that the immediately given things "per se are mere appearances ”and“ have the ground of their being not in themselves, but in the general divine idea [...] ”; this idealism forms “the basis of all religious consciousness”, because “this also regards the epitome of everything that is there, the existing world in general, as created and ruled by God” (E, § 45 Z). Everything depends on the abandonment of the view, already presupposed by religion, according to which “the given material of perception and the manifold of imagination are to be regarded as the real versus the thought and the concept”: In the concept the reality of the perception and the concept is raised His and with it the appearance that they had as the real (HW VI, 259f.). That view characterizes a philosophy that “does not rise above the senses in being” because it contrasts thinking and being (ibid. 404).

2The bond from the elevation of thought above the sensual is “the Nullity of His of the world ”: This is to be explained“ for the nothing ”and its being for“ appearance ”, because the absolute truth“ beyond that appearance is only in God, God is only the true being ”(E, § 50 A). Since there can be no absolute objects and no truth apart from God (HW XI, 53, 64), the world has no true reality and is “only an ideal” or “created” (HW XVII, 243), ie “a mere one Appearance and a harder deception ”(HW XIII, 22). Accordingly, philosophy is “knowledge of the non-worldly” (HW XVI, 28). For it has "no other object than God, and is so essentially rational theology and, as a service of truth, continuing worship" (HW XIII, 139).

3Logic is “the metaphysical theology which contemplates the evolution of the idea of ​​God in the ether of pure thought” (HW XVII, 419; cf. HW V, 44). Since it is the science of “pure concepts” and the “abstract” or “pure idea”, logic has to do “with pure abstractions” or “abstract beings” (HW IV, 11; E, § 19; HW VI, 470). “Pure” means “freed from all sensual concretion” (HW V, 55). In logic "the thoughts are pure thoughts" - since they do not contain any "empirical", but rather have "a content belonging to the thinking itself and produced by it" (E, § 24 Z 2) - and are considered to be "the thing in itself itself ”(HW V, 43): Thinking is identical with its object and is“ in a completely free relationship ”to it, because“ it seeks and finds only itself in the object ”(E, § 467 Z). The content of thinking is “up to itself autonomic Wise ”, i.e.“ the peculiar determinations of thinking itself, which have no other reason than thinking itself Heteronomic is one by imagination at all Given“(HW IV, 162). And since pure thought has “a much higher reality” than “sensual, external existence” (ibid.), Logic is the actual ontology.

4Knownen means to dissolve what is sensually given or what is heteronomous to thinking into thought determinations. Because the true nature of the object “only comes mediating of a change ”to consciousness, and only through“ our subjective activity which transforms what is immediately available ”(E, § 22 and Z). The sensual matter is namely "spiritualized through the negative of the activity of the spirit [...] and canceled out as sensual" (E, § 442 A). The essence of the spirit consists precisely in the ideality or abolition of externality and all its activities are “different ways of returning externality to internality”, that is to say, “idealization and assimilation of externality”: as the I grasps the manifold material, it becomes this "Poisoned and transfigured, loses its isolated, independent existence and receives a spiritual existence" (E, § 381 Z). Thinking assimilates the external objects and thereby makes them "subjective, produced by us, belonging to us" (E, § 246 Z), that it idealizes them, i.e. transfigures them into thought structures and destroys their independence. Since knowledge consists in the “annihilation of externality” (E, § 552 A), its pattern is

the practical behavior in which lies this absolutely idealistic belief that individual things are nothing in themselves. [...] Philosophical true idealism consists in nothing else than the determination that the truth of things is, that as such they are directly individual, i.e. sensual, - only appearance, appearance are (E, § 246 Z).

5In this regard, animals are not as stupid as some metaphysicians, “for they approach things, grasp, grasp, consume them. [...] Only when one does violence to the Proteus, i.e. does not turn to the sensual appearance, he is forced to tell the truth ”(ibid .; cf. HW III, 91). Accordingly, Hegel shares the thesis of modern science that one must do violence to nature in order to discover its essence, and the term "digestive philosophy" 1 coined by Sartre applies to his thinking.

6As Feuerbach remarks, Hegel's philosophy is “rational mysticism” (GW IX, 53): 2 Whoever does not give up it does not give up theology (ibid. 258), which is “belief in ghosts” (ibid. 247). 3 Hegel's thought it is based on the theological assumption that externality is to be taken “in the sense of alienation, of a defect, of a defect that should not be. Because the real thing is still the idea. Nature is only the form of its otherness ”(MEW Ergbd. I, 588) and therefore shows“ no freedom, but necessity and contingency ”(E, § 248) .4 It is“ this, not being able to be completely adequate to the concept “(HW XX, 220). Such "impotence of nature to hold onto the concept in its execution" consists in "exposing the execution of the particular to external determinability" and has the effect that the concept cannot understand, construct and deduce the contingencies of nature (E, § 250 and A; see HW VI, 282). However, this does not prevent us from deriving coincidences such as the five number of continents and the senses from the term

7Kimmerle aptly remarks that in Hegel's system “thinking and its realization in consciousness, omitting nature, goes back in itself as a circular movement, so that from this theory a reference to reality is no longer necessary, since it is reality completely in itself claims to include “6. It is important to get rid of what is immediately given and thus to eliminate the other of thinking. Thought then confuses itself with reality, which can only be understood through thoughts, but does not consist of thoughts, but of sensual givens.

8What Jacobi says about the nihilistic character of Kant's and Fichte's idealism applies all the more to Hegel's thinking. "Pure reason is an understanding that only hears itself" (JW III, 19f.). Since knowledge is construction and presupposes that “its objects are divided by a kind transubstantiation to be transformed into mathematical and logical beings ”(ibid. 351), the philosophizing of pure reason must“ be a chemical process whereby everything but it is transformed into nothing ”:“ Man only knows when he understands; and he only understands by - transforming thing into mere shape - making shape into thing, thing into nothing ", because in order to understand a being," we have to objectively - as existing for itself - in thoughts, annihilate it, destroy it in order to make it absolutely subjective, to let our own creature - a mere scheme - become ”(ibid. 20f.). Abstraction and reflection are therefore “an act of dissolving all being into knowledge; progressive annihilation [...] through increasingly general terms ”(ibid. 23).

9That kind of knowledge, which he considers the only possible, is countered by Jacobi with immediacy as revelation and ignorance (JW II, 166ff., 323). There is, however, a non-irrationalist alternative to nihilistic knowledge.

10 Feuerbach overturns Hegel's idealism in that he "opposes the negation of negation, which claims to be the absolutely positive, the positive that is based on itself and positively founded on itself", that is, "the sensually certain, self-founded position" (MEW Ergbd. I, 570). Because he understands “the absolute being as a sensual being, the sensual being as an absolute being” (GW IX, 431) by making “the real, the sensual the subject of itself” and not “the same absolutely independent, divine, primative meaning derived only from the idea ”(GPZ, § 31). Only the sensual is true, because "something is only true when it is no longer something mediated but something immediate" (GPZ, § 38).

The real in its reality or as real is the real as the object of meaning, is the sensual. Truth, reality, sensuality are identical. Only a sensual being is a true, a real being. Only through the senses is an object given in the true sense - not through thinking for itself. The object given or identical to thinking is only a thought (GPZ, § 32; cf. GW VI, 102; GW IX, 441; GW X, 135f.).

11Sensations therefore have "no empirical, anthropological meaning", but rather "ontological, metaphysical Significance ”(GPZ, § 33).

12Sensuality is "an element differentiated from thinking" (GW VI, 19; cf. GPZ, § 25) and its preference is an advantage of immediacy over mediation, passivity over activity, intuition before the concept, the object before the Subject.

In the following I will try to show that Husserl's approach is similar to Feuerbach's

14Husserl's thinking is characterized by an “aversion to the concept” and a “rejection of speculation” based on a “conception of the 'concept' as a derived, well-founded, perception-related” and a “prejudice about the speculative tradition of the Philosophy (speculative = formal = abstract = primitive concept = intuition!) ”8 By intending to“ return to 'immediacy' and its rehabilitation ”, he“ renounces metaphysics, which interprets itself as a hunger for reality Fullness of Reality ”.9

According to him, speculation is “thinking in mere word meanings” (Hua XLII, 271 note 1), namely a bottomless thinking that is based on no corresponding experience and moves in formal abstraction (Hua IX, 345; Hua XXXII, 239). "Speculation cannot be corrected, one can only correct something in a sphere of given things" (letter to E. Spranger, approx. 1.IX.1918). Husserl contrasts the apparent evidence of formal constructions with the return to the intuitive origins of abstractions (Hua XXXII, 90). He opposes speculative philosophizing from above, which moves in pure thinking, with his intuitionism (Hua XXXV, 291), which says, "that I only judge reliably where I can identify and demonstrate what I mean myself, and the final demonstration is seeing or something exactly analogous to ordinary seeing ”(ibid. 288). "Direct looking" (Hua XXXVII, 225) applies as legislation: Since it is "the only possible authority", the view must not be denied or repressed by indirect means which it in truth presuppose (Hua XX / 1, 322) .

16Husserl objectively shares Feuerbach's thesis that the “course of speculative philosophy from the abstract to the concrete, from the ideal to the real […] is wrong. In this way one never comes to true, objective reality, but always only to the realization of one's own abstractions ”(GW IX, 251). You have to put the “thoughts on materials [found] which we can only acquire by means of sensory activity ”(GW V, 15), that is, proceeding not from above, but from below. Phenomenology is fighting

against every epistemology of mere generalities, against every epistemology that speculates dialectically from above about knowledge, instead of getting to know it itself according to its concrete, intuitive form and subjecting it to an adequate description of its essence. It must descend from the height of its generalities to the fertile bathos the immediately adequate phenomenological perception of essence (Hua XXXV, 274).

17Husserl criticizes Maimons, Reinhold's and Fichte's “falling into immanent mythologies or violent constructions of immanent teleologies” (Hua VII, 376) as well as the “hypostasis of formal concepts in romantic idealism”, which makes formal concepts “real existences” and from them “that Empirical constructed ”(ibid. 411). He rejects Fichte's “arbitrary and absurd constructions” as well as the “intellectual artifacts of his scientific teachings” (Hua XXV, 276, 269) and explains: “All of German idealism has always sucked me. I've been looking for reality all my life ”.10

18Husserl “sets finite subjectivity absolutely” .11 An infinite subjectivity and a non-sensual understanding are “a nonsense”: “All knowledge is accepting, therefore not 'unfortunately' accepting” 12 - just as externality is not something that is not should be. Sensuality belongs to the “essential elements of a subjectivity in general” (Hua XVII, 34), since it is “the fundamental substrate for all higher consciousness” (Ms. B I 4 / 4b; cf. Hua IV, 334ff.). Essential the spiritual subject is bodily and has organs of perception (Hua XIV, 136). What kind of sensuality and organs of perception it has is one empirical Question (Hua XXVII, 11f.).

19Without relation to a sensual perception, thinking loses its meaning (Hua Mat III, 174): The possibility of a pure intellect, which in categorical thinking without sensuality has given its objects as purely intellectual, is "pure nonsense" (ibid. 170) . Since the categorical is based on sensual perception, the talk of pure understanding is only justified insofar as the general perceptions "not only to exclude everything individual, but everything sensuous from their intentional content”(Hua XIX, 712f.). 13 Only“ in the provision of a judgment function that is subsequently separated from perception ”, ie in the creation of the purely logical concept, the understanding is productive, but such achievement is based on the structure of experience, there in sensual unitary forms Lie “before the rational function of conceptuality and judgment” (Hua VII, 224). There is namely a "sensual motivational situation", i.e. a "motivation that is already in the sensual" and is different from the "judgment motivation" (Ms. B IV 12 / 3b). So sensuality provides the understanding with an objectively structured material.

Husserl describes the realm of a priori or essential laws as “reason”.He criticizes Kant's harsh opposition between sensuality and reason (Hua VI, 420f.), Since there are truths of reason that are based on sensual ideas (Hua XXVIII, 403), which is why sensuality is "a sphere [...] of real reason" (Hua XXXVII, 220) .14 Experience can only be grasped logically and conceptually insofar as there is “rationality” in its givens (Hua Mat IX, 439). Namely, where there are no withstanding objects, terms are not applicable: Everything can be determined, connected, counted regardless of its particularity, but determining, connecting, counting presuppose that what is determined, connected, and counted is identifiable as the same and not atomized, so really is (Hua XXXVI, 23; Ms. A VII 20 / 43a). If experience had no factual law before thought formation and no coherent world were vividly given through sensual experience, then no knowledge of the world would be possible (Hua XXXII, 15, 116, 142). Since the world of experience "has certain intuitively demonstrable structures that bind us, which make demands on our predicative thinking [...], the demands to be made on sensible cognition are not those that we formally deduce empty", but "those that the world itselfthat are initially sensual, to us through its own sense, insofar as this original and first sense (sensible world) has in itself possibilities and tendencies towards idealization as "objective" ”(ibid. 101f.).

As real beings, Feuerbach “only applies very specific, sensual, individual things and beings” (GW IX, 441; cf. GW VI, 147). Husserl understands “real” and “individual object” as synonyms that denote something that is in principle “perceptible” (Hua XVII, 457). According to him, "reality […] a preference for being over any unreality, provided that all unrealities are essentially related to real or possible reality ”(ibid., 177) .15“ All conceptual truth presupposes experience, every conceptual content presupposes an experiential being, all being presupposes individual being ”(Hua VIII, 408).

22Feuerbach writes: “The negation of the senses is the source of all madness and malice and sickness in human life; the affirmation of the senses is the source of physical, moral and theoretical health ”(GW X, 144). Against the Platonic, Christian and rationalistic "degradation of sensuality", according to which this "represents a faculty of mere confused imagination, the source of all appearances, deceit, all error and all badness" (Hua Mat III, 170), Husserl maintains that sensuality is none “Opaque medium, which instead of things in themselves gives mere appearances of the same” (ibid. 172). Things are per se sensual, which is why sensual experience “the Mode of self-possession of natural objects"Is (Hua XVII, 170) and" the thing perceived in perception the thing itself is, in his own existence ”(ibid. 287). Phenomena are true being and have the reason for their being in themselves, while inexperienced entities are “empty substructures of […] bottomless thinking” and differ from ghosts only in that they “were not given through experience, that is, through they cannot be refuted ”(Hua XXXII, 216).

According to Husserl - just as according to Feuerbach - "the real can only be drawn from perception" (ibid. 120) and consists in the sensual, i.e. in the correlate of a simple perception (Hua Mat III 168). The idea of ​​supersensible things in itself is absurd insofar as the real is "that which can be seen in a possible sensuality" or something "which is sensually to be had" (ibid. 171) .16 What exists as "being-in-itself" , has "its content of possible experiences" (Hua XXXII, 63). Against the mysticism of a hidden being of nature, Husserl maintains that things “have no mysteries” because although they always offer new properties in the course of experience, they are “something given, something perceptible, as what they are, tangible and nothing hidden ”(Hua XIII, 10). Against the prejudice that the world of experience is not a true one (Hua VI, 397), he considers "the world as and as it is in real experience, the 'world of sensuality'" (ibid. 360) to be the only one real and true world (ibid. 49; Hua XXIX, 140) .17

24 Precisely because they universal Are determinations or predicates that everything According to beings (HW VI, 36), logical categories have no real meaning. The logical-metaphysical determinations - which “do not determine an object because they extend to all objects without distinction” - do not grant real knowledge and can only be made determinants of real things if “the object encompasses whole abstract Provisions in which he no longer recognizable is, is reduced "(GPZ, § 49), i.e. is volatilized in abstract thoughts (MEW I, 216; MEW XIII, 632). Understanding, however, "does not, as Hegel thinks, consist in recognizing the determinations of the logical concept everywhere, but in grasping the peculiar logic of the peculiar object" (MEW I, 296). Since Hegel's only interest is to rediscover the logical idea in every element, he makes the real subjects “their bare ones Names”Instead of understanding them“ in their specific essence ”, which is why“ there is only the appearance of real knowledge ”(ibid. 211). Because it's all about “the abstract, meaningless Form ”, whose“ content is merely a more formal"can be content generated by the abstraction of all content", i.e. only about "the general, abstract forms of abstraction belonging to every content, therefore also indifferent to all content" (MEW Ergbd. I, 584).

Against the “mythology” of “pure” or “abstract thinking”, Husserl observes: “In principle, all terms come from perception and have a sense related to intuition. So there is no such thing as pure thinkingthat leads to other truth than the mere truth of consequence, which there is called formal logical contradiction ”(Ms. A VII 20 / 20a-21a). Insofar as it is pure or free from the sensual, the logical has none real Meaning (Hua XIX, 729; Hua XVII, 152). Because logical laws are not factual Laws that apply to the reality appearing in perception and experience, but rather formal Laws that apply only to the analytical contexts of thought (Hua XXIV, 333), namely "laws for objects in general, insofar as they are thought to be determined by mere categories" (Hua XIX, 101). Accordingly, they only concern "what is true of objective objects in general by virtue of the pure" form of thought ", i.e. what stands for the objective validity of meanings a priori all matter of the signified objectivity on the basis of the pure form of meaning in which they are thought, allows to express ”(ibid. 344). Such laws say nothing about the real: They are only “trivial generalities, against which an assertion may not argue because it would otherwise be absurd”, which is why the harmony of thought with them only guarantees “that it is formally unanimous in itself be ”(Hua XVIII, 145f.).

The formal thought-determinations of beings, insofar as they are thought, do not have an ontological scope, but the factual determinations of objects as they are given in experience, since they are not based on thinking, but on the particular essential nature of the given. The actual ontologies are the material ontologies (Hua III, 26) precisely because - in contrast to logic or formal ontology - they do not consist of universal, formal, logical terms, but of general, factual, sensual terms. The latter are drawn from experience and can be grasped in it, since they have a material or descriptive content (Hua XLI, 59; Hua XXXII, 197f.). They have a real meaning insofar as they are not pure, but rather contaminated by the respective factual nature of what is heteronomous in thought. Formal terms, on the other hand, represent “an external reflection on the matter” (HW VI, 271) and are “only subjective” (E, § 194 no. 1). Contrary to what Hegel thinks, they remain so and - as Marx remarks (MEGA II / 5, 31) - cannot objectify themselves without external material.

27The structure of reality depends on material categories which can only be grasped through an abstraction in which the factual content is not eliminated. Husserl distinguishes between two types of abstraction, which correspond to two types of concepts: formalization, whereby the logical or formal concepts are extracted, and generalization, which extracts the sensual or material concepts. The formalization consists in the "mental elimination of the matter" (Hua XXIV, 109) and leads to formal or objects of thought that are characterized merely by determinations, the eachobject get, if it is thought. Generalization, on the other hand, consists in grasping the respective material essence of what is sensibly given. It leads to the factual general, since it disregards the accidental individual determinations in order to emphasize "the peculiarity of the content" (ibid.), I.e. the essential structure that all objects of a certain type thanks to her factual peculiarity listened to. 18

28 In contrast to the ontological or sensual forms, the logical or thought forms nonefactual or realto shape of the given, but ingredients of the judgmental activity.19 The objects are grasped intellectually through the logical or thought-forming process, but their own being or sensual content remains unaffected because it belongs to our mere subjective activity and does not result in a new real object, but one for the sensual object gives non-sensual form (Hua XIX, 686f., 715f.). Since thought-determinations are added by the thinking activity, they do not belong to the objects as they are given in experience, but "only as they become substrates of judgment through thinking and thus receive categorical shape, that is, from the point of view of thinking" (Hua XVII, 405f.). The sensual world "remains unchanged as it is, in its own essential structure, in its own concrete causal style, whatever we do artlessly or as art" (Hua VI, 51), since no spiritualization, poisoning and transfiguration can change what is given.

29 According to Feuerbach, nature is an "immediate" (GW VI, 103), "a first, original, non-divisible being" (ibid. 102), namely "everything that you see and does not come from human hands and thoughts" (ibid. 105). According to Husserl, there is a “sequence of steps” or “gradation: 'mere nature' and 'culture that comes from me alone'” (Hua XXXIX, 30), which is why every cultural world is “based on a world that is still cultureless and generally free of objective spirit” (ibid. 28), ie rejects "a layer of mere nature" (Hua Mat IX, 182).

The world that appears to me must appear directly to me in a basic layer, it must be predetermined in such a way that it can come to immediate self-giving in a basic layer. What appears to me to be directly perceptual then establishes the perception of the mediocre, which is just mediate, well-founded perception. The universe of objects that are given to me as being directly tangible [...] and must be given as such is the nature. Even values ​​of value, teleological-practical characters that she received from me alone are indirect (Hua XXXIX, 30).

30Cultural determinations stand in a non-essential relation to the thing and do not belong to the objective structure of a given world. Because in contrast to the natural modes of appearance, which are constituted passively, the meaning as a tool, art form, etc. is “a purely spiritual-personal achievement” (ibid. 277). Cultural objects come from a subjective creation and are related to a personal community: “The subject relationship belongs to its own essential content”, while a thing “in its experiential content itself, in its objective sense itself does not contain any subjectivity related to it” (Hua IX, 118).

In contrast to the world of things, the world of culture is only accessible to a limited extent and has limited objectivity (Hua I, 160ff.). "Nature is that which is unconditionally universally accessible for everyone, that which is unconditionally common, that which can already be experienced identically, that which is a prerequisite for a general expression of spirituality" (Hua Mat VIII, 401 note 2). Since the givenness of spiritual senses is only possible through embodiment in a material object, and is therefore based on the givenness of physical bodies (Hua XVII, 163, 294; Hua XXXVII, 218f.), The "world of things compared to the world of culture is in itself earlier" (Hua IX, 119). What has meaning is namely a sensual content which, thanks to its aesthetic structure, can be identified in the experience (Hua XXXIV, 261; Hua XXXIX, 324). So while spiritual meanings can only be given due to material things, the latter can be given even if they have no spiritual meaning: We sometimes perceive things that have no meaning for us and that we cannot classify except as spatial things. Accordingly, “after all, material reality underlies all other realities” (Hua III, 354).

In experience, therefore, there is a sensual core of content that is identical for everyone, that is, something “absolutely objective”, beyond which, depending on the special communities, there are changing cultural provisions that form “the relatively objective” (Hua XXXIX, 295, 297): Even for to the Zulu the books are there as things and it is the same sun that is mythologized differently (ibid. 692; Hua XXIX, 387). What enables identification and gives the world “its identity and reality in relation to the changing modes of apperception” (Hua XV, 167) is the “,aesthetic Essence"(Hua XXXIX, 685), i.e. the" absolutely identical objective structure "that functions as the" lower layer of all realities "(ibid. 297f.).

33Husserl describes the “identity structure” of all different environments as the “natural concept of the world” (Hua IX, 496). His idea of ​​a transcendental aesthetic stems from Avenarius' idea of ​​a development of the natural concept of the world, namely from its eidetic reinterpretation in the sense of a description of the essential structure of the world of experience (Ms. A VII 20 / 47a): Since all theories refer to the above all theories Relate to the given world and can only have a justified meaning if they do not violate the meaning of the immediate givenness, it is important “to describe the world as it appears to me right away gives or describes the experience in terms of what has been experienced as such ”in order to emphasize the“ general sense framework of the world in direct experience ”(Hua XIII, 196f.).

The transcendental aesthetic is the description of the essence of the a priori, whereby objects and a world are constituted “before the categorical actions” or passively (Hua XVII, 297). So it does not concern the spirit, that is, the activities of the subject (in Hegel's language: the negative of the activity of the spirit) and their products, but nature, that is, that which is immediately given before the intervention of the subject, and consequently the sensual fusions, those after the factual Essential laws and are “unhistorical” (Hua Mat VIII, 338).

In transcendental aesthetics, a restriction to body perception is carried out by excluding judicial knowledge and the cultural world (Hua XI, 295; Hua XXXIX, 268). The experience on the one hand and the thought-based determination and apprehension as well as the action on the other hand are juxtaposed to the world "pure as experienced, the world 'pure experience'", or more precisely the "form of experience of a world in general (or the world common to us all)" to take out, "which just necessarily precedes everywhere, underlies, if at all, subjectivity to think about what it has experienced, to interpret it one way or another" (Hua XXXIX, 260).

36Husserl's idea of ​​a transcendental aesthetic objectively represents the implementation of Feuerbach's demand for a "unadulterated, objective Intuition of the sensual ”(GPZ, § 43) and at the same time the inversion of the religious and Hegelian approach: Since the true reality is not the concept or the thought, but the given, it is important to grasp the alien material as it was before the mental activity, ie in which "immediate sensual intuition" is given (ibid.). One must therefore distinguish “what is a matter of the given and what is a matter of ego participation” (Ms. A VII 13 / 101b) in order to subtract subjective ingredients such as the determinations of thought, i.e. “the moment of the conceptual” (Hua XXIV, 319).

37Although precipitates from thought activities can adhere to the given and experience can only be described by thoughts, one can always distinguish between what is sensually experienced or given on the one hand and the thought activity practiced on it and the thoughts formed in it on the other (Hua IX, 57f.). Only what is passively given and can be grasped in receptivity is sensually experienced.

Any activity of specific thinking that creates new objects in the logical structures, be it on the basis of experience, which are then no longer mere objects of experience, is therefore excluded. E.g. a predicative structure "gold is yellow" is not experienced, but the gold may be experienced and likewise the yellow. No longer: yellow as a predicate of Subject “Gold”, the formation of the subject and the formation of the predicate, accomplishes the judging, relational thinking, in which only that Is, the Actual behavior, which arises from the "facts" (ibid. 95f.).

38This is “a most fundamental difference” (Hua XI, 291): while with ideal objects “a pre-constituting activity precedes the objectifying apprehension” (Hua XXXI, 53), the apprehension of sensual objects is “a mere reception of a pre-constituted sense” (ibid. 41), because they are “given without the participation of the ego and what it does” (Hua XIII, 427), that is, “passively given” (Hua XI, 291) and “originally there before they are grasped” (Hua XXXIX, 40). In contrast to thought structures that are "there for us from our own thinking activity" and "exclusively from the inside are given ”, namely things are“ given alien to the self, given from outside ”and appear in subjective experience“ as already existing in advance ”(Hua XVII, 85f.).

39Since ontology has to disassemble the sensual essential structure of what is immediately given, it consists in the “aesthetics of nature” (Hua XLI, 273), which is nothing but the “ontology of an experienced nature in general” (Hua XXXIX, 268), ie - there the lifeworld is the "given" or "physical nature" (Hua VI, 461) - the "essential doctrine" (ibid. 144) or "ontology of the lifeworld purely as a world of experience" (ibid. 176). Their task - which is considered to be "the first" - is to "emphasize the objectively identical to be preserved through all subjective modes of givenness, the ontic in its ont essence, as it is decided in the experience itself" (Hua XLI, 346).

As Kern observes, Hegel can only make the knowledge of the immediate come to reason “by already placing reason into sensual certainty by showing it […]. So Hegel looks at the immediate or sensual consciousness that neither speaks nor shows itself, not in itself ”. Such a procedure contradicts his assertion that we have nothing to change in the direct knowledge as it presents itself (HW III, 82), and is “guided by the idealistic thesis that direct, sensual consciousness does not have its own existence in itself can have, so it is not a being of its own, but a mere moment of reason ”, which leads to the falsification of sensuality as well as reason.20 Feuerbach already noted that language does not belong to the thing here (GW IX, 43) and that that Hegel's philosophy denoted by the word “the immediate” is completely absent because “from the start he made the immediate a property, in his language: a moment, of the most mediated, of the abstract concept” (GW XI, 151; cf. GW IX , 247).

41Hegel's thesis that experience is not immediate, indeed that there can be nothing that is not mediated by something, is based on the fact that “mediated” is understood in the sense of “conditioned” (E, § 67ff.). The certainty of experience, however, is not immediate in the sense that it has no causes and conditions, but in the sense that “it does not logical mediated or conditional, in such a way that [...] there is still a logical reason, i.e. proof of its certainty, in an idea ". Because proof that experience is true or that its objects have reality can only be provided by experience itself, since it alone has real truth. Therefore the certainty of experience, although it has its conditions, “is immediate, that is, one that is not based on any other certainty. You can see that from the fact that those alleged mediations are based on the content the experience have no influence at all, so that they could give or take away the certainty ”.21

Intermediate ideas (conceptual as well as memories and images) are based on immediate ideas (perceptions). These can prove and deny them, but not the other way around. Therefore, perception functions as a source of authorization for knowledge, although it can be deceptive. Because a perception can only prove to be a deception through another perception that shows what is real instead of the deception (Hua XVII, 287). “Only perception lifts perception out of the saddle” (Hua XXXVI, 40). Accordingly, perception is “nothing to be justified, it gives reasons for it itself” (Hua XXIV, 8) and represents “the ultimate measure of reality” (Hua XL, 314).

43Cognition draws its right only from experience (Hua XXXV, 289; Hua XXXII, 142), which as the "Self-testimony of beings", Hence as"the source of probation and source of removal”Applies (Ms. A VII 20 / 38b), since it“ originally testifies to us real existence ”(Hua VII, 244). Experience forms “the measure of all other respective opinions” (Hua XXXIX, 685) and cannot be evaded because “experience can only be proven and canceled through experience” (ibid. 231), which is why the questioning of an experience presupposes trust in experience (Hua XVII , 164). "What things are, the things about which we alone make statements, about the being or not being, being such or different we alone can argue and make sensible decisions, that they are as things of experience“(Hua III, 100).

The objective truth cannot first be worked out through the knowledge of reason, because the rational person has the world only from experience and all reasonable verifications are based on the unanimity of experience: Natural laws have their factual form from the factual course of experience in observations and experiments (Hua XXXIX , 654 note 2). Since their right is always presupposed, even if it is limited (Hua XXXV, 475), sensual experience is not a random starting point from which one can subsequently free oneself. Even for the scientist, the validity of what is immediately given applies as a “premise”, not “as an irrelevant passage, but as what ultimately justifies the theoretical-logical validity of being for all objective validation, that is, as a source of evidence, source of probation. The standards, tick marks, etc. seen are used as real being and not as illusions ”(Hua VI, 129). The sensual evidence has a "higher dignity of the justification of knowledge compared to that of the objective-logical evidence" (ibid. 130f.), Because the foundation of scientific truths is based on sensual truths: One can get the result of an experiment just read through a perception that just can be questioned by other perceptions. So it is impossible to overcome sensual relativities. Since theories presuppose the validity of perception, is the sensual not just causal-genetic, but epistemicinevitable, and forms not merely the empirical first or the beginning basis, but the substantial basis, i.e.

the first not only in the sense of speculative philosophy, where the first means that which must be gone beyond, but the first in the sense of the inevitable, of that which exists and is true by itself. […] The senses are […] the permanent basis, even where they disappear in the abstractions of reason (GW VI, 100).

45 According to Maimon, knowledge is "given to the faculty of cognition insofar as the basis of this cognition is not to be found in the faculty of cognition but rather outside it", that is, in so far as its "way of origin [...] cannot be explained from the faculty of knowledge according to general laws of the faculty of knowledge" .22 The red one Color is given, since the faculty of knowledge “cannot produce it out of itself, in a manner prescribed by itself, but merely behaves in a suffering manner” .23 The given is namely the matter the intuition that arises “through suffering” during which shape Arises “through activity ”.24 For the forms of order of the manifold are“ not [...] based on a particular object; but in our faculty of knowledge in relation to all sensible objects without distinction ”.25

46 According to Husserl, the sensual Forms and thus the structure of experience not from the activity of the subject, but from the nature of sensual content, and are in the same sense as this given (Hua XIX, 715). Its reason is therefore to be found outside the cognitive faculty, and the way in which it originates cannot be explained from it according to general laws of cognitive faculties. The room is not subjective “Form in us”, as Maimon thinks, 26 but one factual Shape of real objects. By overturning the Copernican turn, Husserl describes space as “a form quality of all things”: “It belongs to them and they belong to it (as being in it as the form), apart from all subjective conditions of perception”, because it is “not a subjective condition of perception that things can only be given through perception” (Ms. B IV 1 / 33b). The impossibility of having sensual material in spatial form does not therefore mean “the inability to form a different view”, which is based on the peculiarity of the subject to “have to classify all sensual material in a spatial form”; but an "essential impossibility", which is based on the peculiarity of the thing, which is why "sensual material is not necessarily spatially formed", but "sensual properties of a sensually given thing [...] must necessarily be spatial" (Hua VII, 357f. ). Not the Shape of things hangs on the subjective nature of perception off, but it is the Form of perception, the of the factual nature of things depends.

47Lewis contrasts the chaos of experience or the given with the “Platonic heaven of our concepts”, which bring a fixed order into experience (MWO, 254, 230, 265, 307). According to him - just as after Kant - every law depends on “some ordering by mind” (ibid. 254) and is placed in the phenomena: “Much of the basic uniformity of various areas of experience is not discovered but imposed by categorial procedures which argue nothing intrinsically orderly in what is given "(ibid. 366). Insofar as it implies the foresight of the non-given, knowledge presupposes a meaning that is added to the given and is to be verified in a further experience, that is, a form, interpretation or construction which the mind imposes on the immediately given by placing it under a Category is subsumed and placed in relation to others (ibid. 38f., 44, 51ff., 118f., 132).

48Because he shares the “mythology of the generating intellectual activities”, which is based on the “entirely mythological assumption” that the given is a chaos of sensations that must first be formed by means of synthetic functions, 27 Lewis refers back to thinking, to preconceptual ones To explain connections that are passively constituted and that characterize the experience of animals. Because there is not only “a subjective setting and formation of a relationship”, but also a “real 'relationship'” (Hua XLI, 262), which is given before the intervention of the subject and which is a “material” or “ real unity ”(Hua XIX, 291; Hua XXXI, 105) .28 Everything that can be experienced has“ relationship characters ”, since before every synthetic act it carries with it“ codetermination in relation to what it is not itself ”(Hua XXXIX , 5). What Lewis considers to be a conceptual interpretation that we add to the given in view of past experience is not created through thought activity, but given sensually: "The given represents its own interpretation of itself“.29 The reference of a given to other given does not come from the intervention of the subject, but from the subject-independent peculiarity of the content, since it is based on the similarity, the one relation of ideas and is passive, i.e. given "without active reference" (Hua XXXV, 437; Hua XXXII, 153; Hua XI, 406). Thanks to them, everything that is perceived is typically apperceived before conceptual apprehension (Hua XXXII, 200; Hua XLI, 388, 273). "The inductive wake-up connection between the original present and the re-remembered past not a hypothesis"(Hua XXXII, 151), but belongs to the" original [...] inductive power "of experience (ibid. 143).

49Sensual givens are the result of sensual connections. There can be no isolated contents (Hua XI, 157f., 175), since every sensual content appears in sensual unitary forms (Hua VII, 222 note 2). But every sensual content has a quality which determines its connections. What and how it appears depends on the sensual context, but this comes from the factual peculiarity of the sensual content present. Lewis himself observes that if the individual contents had no absolute property, they could not have any relative property either, and if they had no independent determination of their own, even the relationships between them would be indeterminate (MWO, 154ff.). So he recognizes that the given is not a "smooth undifferentiated flux":

Experience, when it comes, contains within it just those disjunctions which, when they are made explicit by our attention, mark the boundaries of events, "experiences" and things. [...] attention cannot mark disjunctions in an undifferentiated field. [...] That the rug is on the floor or the thunder follows the flash, is as much given as the color of the rag or the loudness of the crash (ibid. 58f.).

50 Lewis even speaks of a “natural cleavage” (ibid. 257) 30 by asserting that the content of what is immediately given has an epistemic role and determines the conceptual interpretation (ibid. 310, 157, 276). Regarding a filler's experience, Lewis notes:

what I refer to as "the given" in this experience is, in broad terms, qualitatively no different than it would be if I were an infant or an ignorant savage. […] The given […] is what remains unaltered, no matter what our interests, no matter how we think or conceive. I can apprehend this thing as pen or rubber or cylinder, but I cannot, by taking thought, discover it as paper or soft or cubical. [...] no one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate presence in consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter (ibid. 50-52).

51The independence of reality from thinking means first and foremost that Givenness of the given, the one sensual Has character and through Thinking activity cannot be scooped up or changed (ibid. 193, 66, 48f.). 31

Hegel's reinterpretation of the impotence of the concept (of thinking) to deduce the peculiarities of nature (reality) into the impotence of nature to hold onto the concept serves to conceal an embarrassment. As Lewis notes, the only sense of knowledge is that the content of knowledge is independent of mind, since knowledge seeks something that is beyond itself and that it knows it could miss. In taking over Krug's objection to Schelling32 factually, Lewis emphasizes that a fundamental difficulty of idealism lies in the fact that it cannot deduce the particular content of experience and knowledge.Because if all Conditions of experience and reality indwelling the mind and thus Nothing outside of the mind can determine what the mind recognizes, then - once the mind is established - not only the general form of knowledge, but also the content in all its specifics must be determined. Either so the question is answered why I am these Have experience and just these Find reality, or one must recognize that the peculiarity of experience is ultimate and inexplicable, which is why the given forms a condition of reality independent of the spirit (ibid. 189ff.).

In contrast to what Hegel thinks, experience forms “the single Soil of knowledge ”(E, § 40), since both real (sensual) contents and real (sensual) forms sensualgiven are.

Reality does not consist of thoughts or concepts, but of those individual sensible things that are immediately given and, according to Hegel, are appearances or nothing. Outwardness, otherness in relation to the idea and the spirit, heteronomy in relation to thinking, inevitability from concepts are the characteristics of the real. The reality independent of thinking is that which is immediately given before the intervention of the subject, i.e. the sensual as it is given with its sensory structures. It is not a state of the subject or a private and immanent sensation, but the only thing that can be experienced intersubjectively. While the given is something that appears and has sensual qualities such as color, expansion and spatial shape, sensation is not something that appears and, in principle, has no sensual quality, since it is by no means colored, expanded, etc.

55The real is not the idea or the spiritual, but the factual or alien to the ego in its immediate givenness. It does not show freedom, but necessity and randomness.

56thanksgiving I would like to thank the director of the Husserl archive in Löwen, Prof. Julia Jansen, for the permission to quote from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, and Wolfgang Kaltenbacher for the advice on improving the text.

57E Hegel, G. W. F., Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciencesin the floor plan. In HW, Vol. VIII-X.

58 GPZ Feuerbach, L., Principles of the philosophy of the future. In GW, Vol. IX.

59GW Feuerbach, L., Collected Works. Edited by W. Schuffenhauer. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1967ff.

60Hua Husserliana. Edmund Husserl - Collected Works. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950ff.

61Hua Mat Husserliana materials. Edmund Husserl - Materials. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001ff.

62HW Hegel, G. W. F., Works in twenty volumes. Edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, ​​1969–1971.

63JW Jacobi, F. H., Works. Edited by F. Köppen and F. Roth. 6 vols. Leipzig: Fleischer, 1812-1825.

64MEGA Marx-Engels Complete Edition. Berlin: Dietz, 1975ff.

65MEW Marx, K., Engels, F., Works. 44 vols. Berlin: Dietz, 1956–1968.

66MWO Lewis, C. I., Mind and the World Order. Outline of a Theory of Knowledge. New York: Scribner, 1929.


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1 Cf. Sartre 1939.

2Fichte speaks of Hegel's “mysticism of the concept” and “mysticism of abstraction” (Fichte 1834, 7; Fichte1869, 156). Kobusch describes Hegel's logic as “critical mysticism” because it is a reflection, the result of which is the “objective thought” and that as “the abandonment of particular subjectivity, understood in a mystical sense, and [as] immersion in the thing, that is General ”applies: While according to scholasticism, the intellect posits the object in the mode of objective being through the formation of the concept or thought, which is why“ the object as a natural thing in its natural being, from the object as a known or as a thought thing in its objective being according to the mode of being is different, according to Hegel, in objective thought both the difference between the knowing subject and the known object as well as that between the modes of being of nature and thought is canceled ”(Kobusch 1987, 270f.).

3 According to Feuerbach, the more recent and especially Hegelian philosophy is “the negation of theology from the standpoint of theology, or the negation of theology […], which is itself theology” (GPZ, § 21). Marx observes that philosophy "on the one hand destroys religion as such, on the other hand only moves itself positively in this idealized, thought-dissolving sphere" (MEW XXVI / 1, 22).

4Nature in Hegel's view is “that which the spirit cannot, so to speak, bring into its own sphere and change” (Neuser 2000, 147), that is that which is given sensually.

5 Cf. E, § 339 Z, 393 Z or § 358 and Z, 401 A and Z, 448 Z.

6Kimmerle 1970, 294.

7This has been neglected by the criticism. The only exception is m.W. the following note: The immediate in the sense of Feuerbach should not be considered asNot or not yet Mediated ”, but rather as“ that which shows itself, gives itself directly or, following Husserl, [as] original self-givenness ”(Löwith 1988, 201).

8Fink 1940, theses 43, 14, 52, 4.

9 Ibid. Theses 29, 54.

10 Plessner 1959, 35.

11Fink 1940, thesis 31.

12 Husserl 1994, 52.

13Therefore, the categorical view is not an actual view: in contrast to the material or sensual beings, “The eidetic generalities to the individual presentation content (Viewability) ", are formalEssence “Cannot be clearly grasped”, “cannot be illustrated”, “non-illustrative”, therefore not “to be given in a perception of the essence” (Hua XLI, 160 and note 1).

14 See De Palma 2014.

15The fact that consciousness can exist without there being a transcendent reality only says: “We can arbitrarily occupy immanent time so that no nature is constituted” (Hua XXXVI, 79). Since the temporal synthesis is independent of the apperceptive synthesis, consciousness can exist, even if the contents fulfilling the tense are factually incoherent and no world can be constituted. TheSo is the relativity of all beings to the transcendental I just formally. The latter is “a relative, an ego-like structure in relation to what is given to the ego” (Hua Mat VIII, 59), and the non-ego forms the “non-subjective core” of the constitution, because “what is for me I am not myself, but what I have consciously in my being [...] as not-I "(ibid. 361):" The subjective is awareness of the non-subjective "(ibid.) and" all ego or spirituality is related to non- I, on unspiritual things ”(Hua XIII, 92).

As Hegel observes, the thing in itself is not something independent of thought, but “only the product of thinking ”, namely“ of thinking that has proceeded to pure abstraction ”(E, § 44 A). But contrary to what he thinks areallnon-sensualEntities or pure abstractions are not real.

17Husserl holds the awareness for reallysince he's there for sensualtangible holds: Inner perception is sensual perception (Hua XIX, 706ff .; Kern 1975, 250ff.). Even Feuerbach regards not only the external but also the internal as an object of the senses (GPZ, § 41).

18 See De Palma 2010.

19 See Hua XIX, 289, 667; Hua XXIV, 292f .; Hua XVII, 398; Hua IX, 25.

20Kern 1975, 119f.

21Schmidt 1835, 247.

22 Maimon 1794, 203.

23Maimon 1790, 13.

24 ibid. 417, 203.

25 ibid. 13th

26 ibid. 203.

27 Scheler 1966, 86, 72f. Feuerbach already wrote: “The book of nature does not consist of a chaos of wild and confused letters or letters, so that only the understanding would bring order and context into the chaos, and the connection of these to an intelligible sentence a subjective and arbitrary of the understanding would be created. No: we distinguish and connect things through our understanding on the basis of the distinguishing and connecting features given by the senses ”(Feuerbach 1904, 322).

28 In contrast to the formal or categorical (ideal) Unity, which is independent of the factual peculiarity of the content and is established through thinking, establishes the materials or sensual (real) Unity in the factual peculiarity of the contents and is constituted in the unity of a sensual perception (Hua XXXI, 101; Husserl 1972, 223, 296f.). Because it comes from a passive synthesis, namely from a synthesis that is not created by synthetic activity or by an act of connection (Hua XLI, 128).

29 Piana 1979, 32.

30 This phrase is reminiscent of Plato Phaedrus, 265f.

31 On Lewis' conception of the given and its ambiguities (which I cannot go into here) see Firth 1968; Gowans 1989; Dayton 1995; BonJour 2004; Haack 2009, 73ff.

32 Cf. Krug 1801, 31ff., 74.

To cite this article

Vittorio De Palma, "The sensually given as the true reality: Husserl's inversion of Hegel's idealism", Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique [En ligne], Volume 16 (2020), Numéro 1, 1-25 URL: https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/index.php?id=1141.

About: Vittorio De Palma

Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici